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CASE NOTES
most serious, questions of practical administration should be sufficient to
convince New York courts that the assertion of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction
under these circumstances is an unwise and difficult method by which to
provide a forum to injured residents.
ELIZABETH C. O'NEILL
Labor Law—Railway Labor Act, Section 2 Seventh—Carrier's Self-
Help and Duty to Operate During a Strike.—Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks v. Florida E.C. Ry. 1—On March 1, 1961, the non-operating railway
unions, pursuant to Section 6 of the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 2 notified
virtually all major carriers that they desired to change the existing collective
bargaining agreements as to wages and advance notice of lay-offs. Negotiation
and mediation on a national level failed to bring about agreement. A Presi-
dential Emergency Board was then appointed to investigate the dispute. By
June 1962, every carrier but Florida East Coast Railway (FEC) had settled
with the unions on the basis of the recommendations of the Emergency
Board. 3
Local negotiations and mediation between FEC and the non-operating
unions were unsuccessful, and both parties rejected the National Mediation
Board's suggestion of arbitration. When the Board terminated its services in
October 1962, the parties were free to resort to self-help.* The non-operating
unions struck in January 1963, and the operating unions refused to cross
the picket lines. After a short time, FEC resumed partial operations, using
supervisory personnel and replacements. The railroad made separate agree-
ments with the replacements as to rates of pay, rules, and working conditions,
on terms different from those in the outstanding collective bargaining agree-
ments.' The non-operating unions subsequently changed their position and
agreed to arbitrate the wage and notice dispute, but FEC refused this offer.°
In September 1963, FEC served a section 6 notice on the unions, proposing
permanent changes in the collective bargaining agreements which would bring
those agreements into conformity with existing operations. Negotiation and
1 384 U.S. 238 (1966).
2 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 156 (1964).
3 384 U.S. at 241.
4 Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 372 U.S. 284 (1963).
The term "self-help" refers to the economic weapons that labor and management have
traditionally used to induce the other to meet its demands. See Florida E.C. Ry. v.
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 336 F.2d 172, 181 (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
990 (1965). For instance, after the RLA procedures have been exhausted, the unions are
free to strike, Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840 (2d Cir.
1962), and the carrier is free to implement the changes discussed and attempt to operate,
Flight Eng'rs Ass'n v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 208 F. Supp. 182 (SD.N.Y. 1962), rad per
curiam, 307 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 945 (1963).
5 These terms were considerably less favorable to the replacements than the out-
standing collective bargaining agreements. For example, FEC reclaccified many jobs to
six-day rather than five-day, thus avoiding overtime pay. Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood
of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 4, at 182.
6 384 U.S. at 242.
153
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
mediation of the changes proposed by this notice failed when FEC insisted on
the presence of a court reporter at the bargaining table.? FEC then formally
announced that it was instituting the changes described in the notice.
In 1964, the United States sued for a preliminary injunction to restrain
FEC from effecting any changes in the outstanding collective bargaining
agreements until the procedures of the RLA had been exhausted as to those
changes. The non-operating unions intervened as plaintiffs. The district court,
pursuant to the Fifth Circuit's decision in a companion case!' granted the
injunction, but permitted the carrier to petition the court for authorization
to make such temporary changes in the collective bargaining agreements
as were reasonably necessary to continue operations.° The carrier immediately
filed such a petition and the court granted permission to: (1) adjust the
ratio of apprentices to journeymen; (2) exceed the maximum age require-
ments of workers; (3) contract out certain work; and, (4) use supervisory
personnel to perform specified jobs where trained workers were unavailable. 10
All parties appealed. The Fifth Circuit affirmed on the basis of its earlier
opinion," and the Supreme Court granted certiorari?'
The non-operating unions and the United States argued that RLA
section 2, seventh" prohibits any change in the collective bargaining agree-
ments except by the methods provided in the RLA or in the collective bar-
gaining agreements themselves." FEC argued that it could unilaterally make
whatever temporary changes it chose during a strike as part of its right to
self-help." HELD• Affirmed. Section 2, seventh is inapplicable to changes
in the collective bargaining agreements when implemented for the duration of
the strike. In order to make these temporary changes, however, the carrier must
petition for equitable relief. The courts will allow only those changes as are
7 United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., 57 L.R.R.M. 2618, 2621 (1964).
8 Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra note 4.
8 United States v. Florida B.C. Ry., supra note 7.
10 The district court denied the following changes: (1) abolition of craft lines and
seniority districts; (2) cancelling of the union-shop; (3) unrestricted use of supervisors
and subcontractors whenever qualified personnel were unavailable; and (4) the use of
non-exempt foremen to perform scope work whenever qualified personnel were unavail-
able. This order is unreported, but is detailed in Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, 348
F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1965). It is important to note that the district court decided only
that the changes it denied were not necessary in FEC's situation, and not that the changes
would not be granted to other struck carriers if necessary.
11 Florida E.C. Ry. v. United States, supra note 10.
12 Brotherhood of Ry. S.S. Clerks v Florida E.C. Ry., 381 U.S. 1008 (1966).
18 48 Stat. 1188 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Seventh (1964). This section provides•
No carrier ... shall change the rates of pay, rules, or working conditions of its
employees, as a class, as embodied in agreements except in the manner prescribed
in such agreements or in section 156 of this title.
In addition to those of RLA 4 6, the principal procedures for settlement of major disputes
are found at RLA § 5, First, 44 Stat. 580 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. § 155, First
(1964), and RLA § 10, 44 Stat. 586 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. 160 (1964).
11 Brief for the United States, pp. 13, 14. Brief for the Non-Operating Unions, p. 27.
16 See Brief for FEC, p. 26. FEC did not argue that it had the right to implement
the permanent changes described in its September 1963 section 6 notice. Id. at 26 n.13.
The carrier did argue that the United States had no standing to bring this action. Id. at
42. The Supreme Court dismissed this contention in a footnote, citing RLA § 2, Tenth,
48 Stat. 1189 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 152, Tenth (1964). 384 U.S. at 242 n.4.
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necessary for continued operations "in light of the inexperience and lack of
training of the new labor force or the lesser number of employees avail-
able. . ."1 ° Justice White, in a dissenting opinion, argued that section 2,
seventh should be applicable to all changes, including temporary changes,
during a strike. 17
There is no judicial precedent, other than the Fifth Circuit's decision
in the companion case, as to whether this section applies to a struck carrier's
temporary changes in the collective bargaining agreements. In addition, there
is no legislative history on the question: Congress did not consider the
application of the RLA to a lawful strike situation. The act was passed to
avoid interruptions in commerce caused by labor disputes, and this was to be
accomplished by inducing the parties to reach prompt, orderly settlements
through RLA procedures 1 8 Congress felt that these procedures would be
successful enough to end the need for either party to resort to self-help,
including strikes. 19
In holding section 2, seventh inapplicable, the Court pointed out that
the collective bargaining agreements actually remained in force during the
strike." These agreements contain such stringent personnel qualifications
that during a strike a carrier would find it almost impossible to secure
a sufficient number, of skilled replacements to operate to any great
extent within their terms. The struck carrier could secure the changes
necessary to operate through RLA procedures, but this would take a
great deal of time, and, during the interim, the public would be deprived of
essential transportation service. Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the
carrier has a duty to make reasonable efforts to maintain service at all times. 21
The Court stated that "the duty runs not to shippers alone but to the public" 22
and exists even when self-help has begun. 23 This duty is placed on the carrier
16 384 U.S. at 248.
17 Justice White contended that the explicit language of section 2, seventh is all-
inclusive and that there is no overriding public policy that would justify any exception.
384 U.S. at 248-50.
18 RLA §1 2(1), (4), 48 Stat. 1186 (1934), 45 U.S.C. II 151a(1), (4) (1964). See
Railroad Yardmasters v. St. Louis, S.F. & T. Ry., 218 F. Supp. 193, 201, 206 (ND. Tex.
1963), rev'd on other grounds, 328 F.2d (5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 980 (1964).
19 67 Cong. Rec. 4503 (1926) (remarks of Congressman Cooper); 78 Cong. Rec.
11716 (1934) (remarks of Congressman Kenney).
20 The Court stated that the unions are the bargaining representatives of all
employees whether or not they are union members. 384 U.S. at 246; Steele v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). This includes replacements who are thus entitled to the
benefits of the collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, the carrier and its employees
cannot supersede the agreements by individual contract. Order of R.R. Telegraphers v.
Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944). Neither of the above two cases cited
by the Court deals with a strike situation, but the Court's reasoning is logical, and its
conclusion is probably valid. See Mission Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 275 (1960).
21 24 Stat. 379 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. II 1(4), (11) (1964).
22 384 U.S. at 245.
23 The Court seems to have misapplied the Interstate Commerce Act in three respects.
First, the sections have reference to the commercial transactions between the carrier and
its customers. Second, the main purpose of these sections is to prevent the carrier from
discriminating between users of its facilities. Howitt v. United States, 328 U.S. 189, 192
(1946); Louisiana & Ark. Ry. v. Export Drum Co., 228 F. Supp. 89, 93 (ED. La. 1964).
Third, the use of the Interstate Commerce Act to construe labor legislation is questionable.
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because "in our complex society, metropolitan areas in particular might suffer
a calamity if rail service for freight or for passengers was stopped." 24 The
carrier could not meet its obligations to the public if it could not operate
during the time it takes to exhaust RLA procedures. 25 Furthermore, since
the struck carrier's only self-help remedy is resumption of operations, its right
to self-help would be meaningless if it could not operate during the above
interval. To enable the carrier to operate sooner, it must be permitted to make
immediate changes in its collective bargaining agreements. Therefore, the
Court concluded, section 2, seventh is inapplicable to temporary changes.
The Court intended to accomplish two objectives: first, to satisfy the
public interest in continuous rail service; and second, to insure that the car-
rier's right to self-help is meaningful. It is submitted, however, that the deci-
sion gives the carrier too much self-help and sacrifices the long-range public
interest in a full service railroad system in order to achieve the immediate
resumption of partial service.
In order to properly analyze the effects of this decision, some reference
to special circumstances operating in the railroad industry is necessary. These
circumstances are: unprofitable services; featherbedding; and increasing
railway unemployment." First, the railroads offer essentially three services,
carload freight, less-than-carload freight, and passenger. Of these, only freight
is profitable." Second, under the collective bargaining agreements, the rail-
roads operate the above services with more workers, having greater skills,
than are actually necessary .28 Third, lay-offs and mergers in recent years
have increased railway unemployment. 25
See Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 93, 110 (1958); Brother-
hood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Florida E.C. Ry., 346 F.2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1965). But
see Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 132 F.2d 265, 269 (7th Cir.
1942), rev'd on other grounds, 321 U.S. 50 (1944). The Court's holding that the duty to
maintain service exists even when self-help begins creates an implication that a carrier
will be prohibited from "locking out" in anticipation of a strike when such action will
cause a cessation of operations. But see American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S.
300 (1965).
24 384 U.S. at 245.
26 As the Court recognized, the duty to maintain service is not absolute. 384 U.S.
at 245. The carrier does not violate this obligation when it is unable to operate because
of conditions beyond its control. City of Alexandria v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 311 F.2d
7, 10 (5th Cir. 1962). A strike could be such a condition. Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 42 M.C.C. 225, 231 (1943) (dictum). Therefore,
there is no justification for allowing the carrier to change its collective bargaining agree-
ments to enable it to satisfy a duty it has already met.
26 The airlines industry is also covered by the RLA procedures. RLA § 201, added by
49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. § 181 (1964). These conditions, however, do not
exist in the airlines industry. See 1964 CAB Ann. Rep. at VII; 1964 ICC Ann. Rep.
134. Moreover, there is a serious shortage of workers in that industry, especially pilots and
mechanics. N.Y. limes, July 7, 1966, p. 74, col. 5. If the unions maintain a solid front, it
is improbable that the airlines could operate during a strike, even with changes in the
collective bargaining agreements. Cf. N.Y. Times, July 19, 1966, p. 24, cols. 1-3.
27 Compare 1962 ICC Ann. Rep. 37 and 1963 ICC Ann. Rep. 87 with 1964 ICC
Ann. Rep. 141-42.
28 Horowitz, Labor's Role in the Declining Railroad Industry, 9 Lab. L.J. 473
(1958).
29 Shils, Industrial Unrest in the Nation's Rail Industry, 15 Lab. L.J. 81 (1964). See
1964 ICC Ann. Rep. 134, 143.
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During a strike, if the railroad can eliminate featherbedding, it can reduce
costs, and if the carrier can hire the minimum number of replacements to
operate only its profit-making carload freight service, then it can increase
profits. These results usually cannot be achieved, however, unless changes
are made in the collective bargaining agreements. The Court removed the
procedural obstacles of the RLA 3° by permitting such immediate changes in
the agreements as would allow the struck carrier to operate with the minimum
number of replacements actually necessary to run the trains efficiently and
safely.
The Court stated in a footnote that a carrier making changes in the
collective bargaining agreements must be engaged in a good faith effort to
restore service to the public," but it did not define what is required by a good
faith effort. If the good faith requirement can be satisfied by only a minimum
effort to secure replacements, then the number of replacements acquired
will probably not be enough to resume all services. Moreover, the ability to
secure replacements is limited not only by the terms of the collective bargain-
ing agreements and the general level of unemployment, but also by such
factors as the lack of training of the unemployed and the ability of union
spokesmen to persuade would-be strikebreakers not to accept employment.
Therefore, it is quite unlikely that the carrier will obtain enough replacements
to resume more than its profitable carload freight service, even with changes
in the collective bargaining agreements.
FEC's own experience in changing its collective bargaining agreements
supports these conclusions. FEC's actions at the bargaining table and its
attempts to operate aroused great bitterness among the unions. Trains were
derailed, and tracks dynarnited.32 From the beginning, FEC was determined
to introduce maximum efficiency during the strike," and thus offered replace-
ments less favorable terms than those of existing collective bargaining agree-
38 Although the railroads are not covered by the National Labor Relations Act, FEC
attempted to draw an analogy from precedents under that act, implying that since
management does not have to follow NLRA procedures with regard to strike-induced
changes, FEC should not have to follow RLA procedures in similar circumstances. Brief
for FEC, pp. 20-21. Under the NLRA there is a duty to negotiate upon request. NLRA
8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. 158(a) (5) (1964). Once an
impasse has been reached, however, and a strike is in progress, management has the right
to deviate from pre-strike practices (e.g., subcontract if there is a shortage of workers),
without negotiating these changes with the union. Hawaii Meat Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d
397 (9th Cir. 1963); Times Publishing Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 676, 684 (1947). But see Mission
Mfg. Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 275 (t960). The NLRA precedents are inapplicable for the
following two reasons: (1) A railroad needs to resume only a part of its service to meet
a strike effectively, since some of its required service may operate at a loss. Therefore, it
needs less self-help than is necessary in other industries; (2) It appears that under the
NLRA, these strike-induced changes do not terminate automatically upon conclusion
of the strike and may remain permanently in effect. See Hawaii Meat Co., supra at
398-99. Under the RLA, however, the pre-strike collective bargaining agreement would be
returned to force simultaneously with the end of the strike. 384 U.S. at 247 n.7
Permanent changes must be achieved via RLA procedures.
31 384 U.S. at 247 n.8.
31 1964 FEC Ann. Rep. 4. See 1963 FEC Ann. Rep. 8; N.Y. Times, April 11,
1963, p. 34, col. 8.
83 United States v. Florida E.C. Ry., supra note 7, at 2621.
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ments.34 Because of these factors, FEC was unable to hire enough replace-
ments to resume full carload freight service until the end of the first year of
the strike (1963) ; it did not resume passenger service at all, or less-than-
carload freight service to any great extent. 85 Due to the delay in resuming
operations, the company showed a decrease in net operating income of
$1,234,272 from the previous year (1962)." In 1964, however, the carrier's
net operating income was more than three times greater than in 1962, in spite
of the fact that freight revenues were roughly the same." At the same time
operating costs were one-third less than in 1962.
In late 1964, the district court enjoined FEC from making all but limited
changes in the collective bargaining agreements." The 1965 statistics demon-
strate that these changes were sufficient to enable the carrier to operate at a
profit. In that year, the carrier was still handling very little passenger or less-
than-carload freight service." Its net operating income was still three times
greater than in 1962, and its operating expenses were only slightly increased
over 1964. Since FEC was able to do this, and since railroad unemployment
is increasing, it seems likely that other struck carriers who obtain the type of
relief given in this case will be able to hire enough replacements to operate
only their profit-making carload freight service, and operate it more efficiently,
thereby increasing their profits during a strike.
Once a struck carrier, with the help of the courts, can operate at a
profit during a strike, then serious consequences follow. First, longer strikes
are likely, for if a struck carrier can obtain the relief allowed in this case and
increase its profits (or at least lose less than it would under normal conditions),
it will have every incentive to prolong the strike." If the strike ends, the
availability of workers would require resumption of full operations, including
the unprofitable services. In addition, since the temporary changes which
increased efficiency would no longer be in effect, operating costs will
soon return to normal. That lengthy strikes will follow from this decision
can be shown in another way. The decision permits the carrier to secure
the necessary changes in the collective bargaining agreements without
negotiating with the unions." Lack of confrontation decreases the oppor-
tunity for settlement. This contention is further supported by the fact
that the FEC strike is the longest in railway history."
The second serious consequence is that, in certain situations, more
84 See note 5 supra.
85 See 1963 FEC Ann. Rep. 5, 12; Brief for the United States, p. 8.
86 The statistics are taken from 1965 FEC Ann. Rep. 12.
87 FEC carried little less-than-carload freight. The freight revenues remained ap-
proximately the same in part because FEC's line to Cape Kennedy which began operating
in mid-1964 increased full carload freight traffic. See 1964 FEC Ann. Rep. 16.
88 See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
89 See Florida E.C. Ry. v. Mason, 177 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 1965). The Florida Supreme
Court held that FEC had only enough qualified personnel to resume partial passenger
service.
40 For example, if the underlying dispute is over wages, it may refuse to reach agree-
ment unless the unions accept a decrease in wages.
41 As Justice White said: "[T]he carrier need not bargain with [the unions] . • • ,
but with the court...." 384 U.S. at 249.
42 N.Y. Times, May 24, 1966, p. 19, col. 3.
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strikes are likely. Assume that a railroad on the verge of bankruptcy is con-
fronted with a demand for a substantial wage increase If, during negotiations,
the carrier is unable to persuade the unions to greatly reduce their demands,
it has two choices: it may accede to the unions' demands and face almost
certain bankruptcy, or it may refuse any increase, thereby inducing a
strike, and then attempt to increase its profits in the manner FEC has done
in the instant case The carrier, faced with such a decision, will most certainly
choose the latter course of action and induce the strike.
Both consequences indicate that this decision is inconsistent with
the public interest in continous transportation service. The Court was
primarily concerned with providing a quick resumption of some services.
During the lengthy strikes that may result in the future, as well as during
the instant dispute, the public, however, is still deprived of two essential
services—passenger and less-than-carload freight. The Interstate Commerce
Commission has felt that these services are of sufficient importance to limit
their curtailment even when they are operated at a loss." Moreover, if the
decision does encourage more strikes, then interruptions of all services will
occur more often.
An additional consequence is that whenever a struck carrier, with the
help of the courts, can increase its profits during a strike, the unions' principal
self-help weapon becomes ineffective. This weapon is the strike; its traditional
success has been a most important factor in securing effective representation
for railway workers. The strike's effectiveness, however, depends on the
amount of loss it inflicts on the carrier. Whenever the struck carrier increases
its profits, the unions, if they desire to end the strike, will have to substantially
retreat from their original position. Further, if they have had to capitulate
once, the unions will be in a much weaker position in future collective bargain-
ing situations. The workers may therefore be deprived of effective representa-
tion.
Once the Court decided to permit the carrier to make temporary changes,
it was faced with the problem of how the changes should be implemented.
Apart from section 2, seventh, there is no statutory or decisional bar, other
than the Fifth Circuit's decision in the companion case," to prevent the
Court from allowing the carrier to make the changes unilaterally. Instead,
the Court held that equitable relief was necessary. No case has been found
where a court has granted equitable relief from the provisions of a collective
bargaining agreement. The Court essentially has created a new remedy to
meet its conception of the public interest in continuous transportation as
weighed against the public interest in prompt, voluntary settlements of
labor disputes. The judicial intervention that this entails is reminiscent of
the pre-Norris-LaGuardia Act years." This decision may well signify the
return of an era of increased judicial activism in setting labor policy. The
43 New York Cent. A.R. v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 958, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
44 Florida E.C. Ry. v. Brotherhood of A.R. Trainmen, supra note 4.
46 See generally Frankfurter & Greene, The Labor Injunction (1930). The area of
labor relations policy is one of "delicate and contemporaneous issues. . . . But economic
sympathies and prepossessions [of individual district judges] may unwittingly foreclose the
solution of these issues." Id. at 132.
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Court felt that in order to minimize the dangers inherent in allowing the
carrier to make unilateral changes, the power "to change or revise the basic
collective agreement must be closely confined and supervised."'a The fact
that it decided that strict judicial supervision was necessary despite its policy
against judicial entanglement, 47 demonstrates the seriousness of permitting
a struck carrier to change its collective bargaining agreements.
The Court held that the carrier must petition for equitable relief. It is
submitted, however, that the Court should not have granted equitable relief
in this case in view of the fact that FEC had rejected arbitration. Section 8
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act provides that unless a party makes every reason-
able effort to settle the dispute, it should be denied equitable relief." In
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., this section was
construed as requiring a carrier to accept arbitration as a condition precedent
to being granted equitable relief." The Toledo Court stated: "Arbitration
under the Railway Labor Act was available, afforded a method for settlement
Congress itself has provided, and until [the carrier] accepted this method
it had not made 'every reasonable effort to settle' the dispute, as Section 8
requires.""
In the FEC case, the Court restricts the application of Toledo by
holding that a carrier which refuses arbitration will be denied equitable relief
only if the union accepts arbitration before going out on strike. Consequently,
both parties are under pressure to agree to arbitrate before the strike. If the
union accepts, the carrier's refusal will result in a denial of equitable relief.
This will relegate the carrier to RLA procedures in order to secure any changes
necessary for profitable operation during the strike. If the union refuses, the
carrier will be able to obtain equitable relief, over union objections, nullifying
the impact of any strike.
These inducements to arbitrate are eliminated by the Court after self-
help has begun, since neither side need then accept arbitration to comply
with Section 8 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. It is difficult to understand how
the initiation of self-help ends the need for exhausting every method to
settle the dispute. The public interest in settlement of labor disputes increases
proportionately with the length of the strike. This interest would be better
served by encouraging both parties to accept arbitration during a strike.
Here, if the carrier had accepted arbitation when the union did, the strike
would have been over by May 1963,61 and the losses the public suffered would
have been significantly smaller.
Another problem facing the Court was the definition of a standard to be
used in future cases for granting or denying changes. The Supreme Court
48 384 U.S. at 246.
47 See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, P. & W.R.R., 321 U.S. 50, 58-59
(1944).
48 47 Stat. 72 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 108 (1964).
49 321 U.S. 50 (1944). But cf. Chicago & W.I.R.R. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S.
Clerks, 221 F. Supp. 561, 569 (ND. Ill. 1963).
" 321 U.S. at 65.
91 The unions agreed to arbitration in late April, May, and October, 1963. Each
time FEC refused. Brief for the Non-Operating Unions, p. 14.
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felt that the carrier should be permitted to make "only those [temporary]
changes as are truly necessary in light of the inexperience and lack of training
of the new labor force or the lesser number of employees available for the
continued operation."'" The opinion does not specify what these changes are
and only sets vague guidelines to help the lower courts ascertain what
changes should be permitted under this decision. Even the Court's vague
standard, however, is preferable to that of the Fifth Circuit, which would
allow whatever changes are reasonably necessary to continue operations."
This leaves too much discretion in the district court and could be interpreted
to include almost anything, including such changes in rates of pay as would
deprive the new workers of the benefits of the collective bargaining agree-
ments."
After examining the effects of the decision and the problems involved in
the implementation of the type of relief given, there still remains the question
of what else the Court could have done. It is submitted that in this case, the
simplest answer is also the best one, i.e., the Court should have held that
section 2, seventh is applicable to temporary changes and required FEC to
effect its changes through the RLA procedures designed for that purpose." In
this way, the parties would be brought together in a situation where bargaining
positions would be more evenly balanced. During these negotiations, both
parties will be under considerable pressure to settle the underlying dispute.
The carrier's self-help weapon, resumption of operations, is of limited effec-
tiveness because it will be a little over a year before it can operate to any great
extent," and until then, it will be losing money. The unions' self-help weapon,
the strike, is also of limited effectiveness; first, because once the procedures are
exhausted and the changes go into effect, it is likely that the railroad will be
able to operate without a loss," and second, because during the strike, the
unions and their members are also losing money. The above circumstances
should be an inducement to an early settlement and consequent resumption of
full services." It is submitted that the public interest is best served by a judi-
cial policy which encourages quick settlements and resumption of all services,
rather than one which permits immediate resumption of partial service at the
expense of almost permanent curtailment of the other services.
52 384 U.S. at 248.
53 348 F.2d at 686.
57 See note 5 supra, and cf. note 20 supra.
55 Section 6, 44 Stat. 582 (1926), as amended, 48 Stat. 1197 (1934), 45 U.S.C. § 156
(1964). There is no duty to negotiate the underlying dispute, but because of the mounting
pressures on both parties, it is likely that they would attempt to reach agreement on all
issues.
56 As is evidenced by the national dispute, it usually takes a little over a year to
follow the RLA procedures. See pp. 155-56 supra. It is uncertain to what extent a struck
carrier could resume operations while following the terms of the collective bargaining
agreements. FEC witnesses testified at the district court hearing that unless changes were
permitted, FEC could only operate between 50% and 70% of its carload freight service.
Brief for the Non-Operating Unions, p. 20.
57 Avoiding loss is not certain, however, because of the many variables involved in
securing replacements; therefore, the railroad, losing money during a strike, is not likely
to wait out the year rather than attempt to reach an early agreement.
58 Cf. NLRB v. United States Cold Storage Corp., 203 F.2d 924, 928 (5th Cir. 1953).
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Additionally, if the Court had held section 2, seventh applicable, it would
have avoided involving the judiciary in the day-to-day supervision of labor
disputes. At the same time, the Court would not have had to define a standard
that, at best, had to be unsatisfactorily vague because of future variables.
In the past two decades the RLA has failed to avert nation-wide strikes
in the railroad and airline industries. On several occasions the President, with
congressional authorization, has found it necessary to seize the railroads and
operate them through receivers until the parties could settle their differences. 59
In the Firemen's dispute, Congress was forced to enact a special law estab-
lishing compulsory arbitration." The result of the instant decision, however,
is to make an ineffective act more ineffective by increasing the likelihood of
lengthy strikes in the railroad industry.
When the RLA was passed, some of its supporters indicated that if the
act failed to avert strikes in this vital industry, Congress could enact additional
legislation." The act has so failed, and the instant decision makes it more
probable that it will fail in the future. Senator Lausche has introduced a bill
that would make arbitration compulsory for labor disputes in the transporta-
tion industry if the parties could not agree following negotiation and media-
tion." Senator Javits has introduced RLA amendments providing a different
solution." Under his proposal, if, after the Presidential Emergency Board's
recommendations, the parties fail to agree, the President is authorized to direct
the Attorney General to petition the district court having jurisdiction of the
carrier to appoint a special receiver to take possession of the lines in the name
of the United States. The court is first to direct the parties to make every
effort to agree to resume such operations as are necessary to protect the public
health and safety. If they fail to agree, a receiver is appointed to operate the
lines without changing conditions of employment (except that if the Emer-
gency Board has recommended changes, the court may order the receiver to
make such temporary changes as it considers appropriate). The receivership
remains in effect as long as necessary, or until the parties reach an agreement.
They are not under a duty to negotiate the underlying dispute, but the
receiver is to encourage them to meet. The carrier is compensated by a rental
fee which is relatively low due to the inability of the carrier to operate
during a strike.
The Javits amendment considerably increases the pressures on both
parties to reach an early settlement before self-help begins, since the unions
face forfeiture of their right to strike, and the carrier faces forfeiture of
possession and operation of its facilities." The amendment avoids some of the
objections to compulsory arbitration in that it preserves free collective
bargaining; yet it still safeguards the public from the harmful effects of a
strike to the same extent as compulsory arbitration.
69 Levinson, Railway Labor Act—The Record of a Decade, 3 Lab. L.J. 13 (1952).
69 77 Stat. 132 (1963). The arbitrators' award was to remain in force for two
years, 77 Stat. 133, 4 4 (1963).
01 67 Cong. Rec. 4570 (1926) (remarks of Congressman Rayburn).
62 112 Cong. Rec. 14394 (1966) (S. 3587) (daily ed. July 11, 1966).
63 112 Cong. Rec. 662 (1966) (S. 2797) (daily ed. Jan. 20, 1966).
64 Id. at 663.
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A detailed examination of the merits of these two proposals is beyond
the scope of this note, but it is urged that the Court's decision conclusively
demonstrates the need for revitalizing the RLA, and also that legislation is the
only source of relief.
JOSEPH KORFF
Trade Regulation—Section 7 of the Clayton Act—Horizontal Mergers
—Share of Relevant Geographic Market.—United States v. Von's
Grocery Co.;' United States V. Pabst Brewing Co.2—In 1960, the de
fendant in the first of these two cases, Von's Grocery Company, the third
largest food retailer in the Los Angeles area, acquired Shopping Bag Food
Stores, the sixth largest. As a result, Von's became the second largest food
retailer in the area with a market share of about 7.5% of the gross sales
The United States brought suit, charging that the acquisition violated Section
7 of the Clayton Acts The district court found: "From the evidence, it
cannot be concluded that the merger in question would probably lessen
competition in the metropolitan area either at the time of the merger or in
the foreseeable future." 4 On appea1, 6 the Supreme Court HELD• Reversed.
The merger of two very large and successful firms in an industry marked
by a trend toward concentration violates section 7, because such a merger
may substantially lessen competition in that industry.
Justice White concurred, stating that, although the majority opinion did
not prohibit all mergers in a concentrating industry, nor all mergers where
the resulting market share of the acquiring firm was 7.5%, a merger of two
leaders, or of a leader and a lesser firm, in an industry marked by concentration
and in which the top eight firms had 40% of the market "would be vulnerable
under section 7, absent some special proof to the contrary." Justices Stewart
and Harlan dissented, concluding that there was no violation of section 7,
because the evidence revealed an unconcentrated retail food industry,
vigorous competition, ease of entry, and equality of competitive position
between chain and independent grocers.
In 1958, the defendant in the second case, Pabst Brewing Company, the
tenth largest brewer in the United States, acquired Blatz Brewing Company,
the eighteenth largest. As a result, Pabst became the fifth largest brewer in
the United States with 4.49% of the sales in the nation, 11.32% of those
in a three-state area (Wisconsin, Michigan, and Illinois), and 23.95% of
those in Wisconsin. The United States brought suit, charging a violation
of section 7. After the presentation of the Government's case, the district
1 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
2 384 U.S. 546 (1966).
3 As amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
4 233 F. Supp. 976, 985 (SD. Cal. 1964).
6 Both Von's and Pabst were appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the
Federal Expediting Act § 2, as amended, 62 Stat. 989 (1948), 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964),
which provides that the Supreme Court shall be the only court of appeal from a final
judgment of a district court in a case charging a violation of the Clayton Act in which
the United States is the complainant.
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